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What Citizens Owe: Two Grounds to Challenge Debt Repayment*1 
 
ANAHÍ WIEDENBRUG 
Government, London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
With the dismantling of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, the global economy entered a 
period of increased financialization.2 Easier access to credit resulted in increased levels of 
sovereign indebtedness, contributing to an ever-greater climate of financial fragility.3 In the 
absence of an international mechanism to restructure sovereign debt,4 responses to sovereign 
debt crises today combine several ad hoc measures. The response to Greece’s sovereign debt 
crisis at the heart of the European Union is but the most recent example of a much more 
general development that has come to characterize sovereign borrowing.5  
Amidst the many uncertainties that govern debt repayment in this highly financialized 
economy, one background norm remains largely unchallenged: the idea that sovereign debt 
must be repaid by the citizenry of the debtor country. Embodied in the legal principle of Pacta 
                                                 
* Earlier versions of this article have been presented at the Finance and Social Justice Workshop in 
Bayreuth, at the 1st UK – Latin America Political Philosophy Network Symposium in Buenos Aires and at 
the LSE Political Theory Research Seminar. I am grateful to the organizers and audiences of these 
workshops for helping me clarify my argument. I am especially grateful to Florencia Alejandre, David 
Axelsen,Christian Barry, Cristian Dimitriu, Jens Van´t Klooster, Marco Meyer, Ignacio Mastroleo, Laura 
Valentini, Gabriel Wollner, Lea Ypi and the journal's anonymous referees for haven taken the time to 
read and comment on this article (often multiple times).  
2For excellent discussions on the process of financialization, see Epstein 2005; Krippner 2011; Turner 
2016. 
3For an overview and canonical analysis of the history of financial crisis, see Reinhart and Rogoff 2009. 
For two excellent accounts of the relationship between financialization, greater financial fragility, and 
sovereign debt crisis, see Roubini and Mihm 2011; Turner 2016. 
4Helleiner 2008.  
5For an introduction to the responses to sovereign debt crises, see Buchheit et al. 2013.  
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sunt servanda, this repayment norm extends to present and future citizens alike, making the 
citizens of the debt-issuing state liable to honour the contract and service the debt the state 
accrued in their name.  
In this article, I defend two sufficient conditions that justify challenging this 
repayment norm. First, I argue that citizens cease to have debt-servicing obligations if the 
state budget as a whole—regardless of its source—is systematically used in the interest of only 
a fraction of the citizenry, unless this fraction is the most disadvantaged in society. Secondly, I 
suggest that whenever the acquisition of further debt threatens the state’s ability to act in the 
public interest, this offers another normative ground to challenge the repayment norm.  
I proceed as follows. In Section I, I ask what makes the repayment norm intuitively 
forceful. While I grant that the repayment norm is normatively weighty in cases in which the 
contracting party is a natural person, the collective agency of the state complicates this 
picture. In Section II, I turn to the odious-debt doctrine as a starting point to defend the first 
sufficient condition to challenge the repayment norm. Section III presents and defends the 
second sufficient condition on the basis of which the citizens’ obligations to service debt 
accrued in their name can be challenged. Section IV presents an ex ante and an ex post 
interpretation of these two sufficient conditions and Section V concludes.  
 
I. REPAYING DEBT THAT IS NOT ONE’S OWN 
Why should sovereign debt be repaid? The most intuitively plausible and powerful answer 
springs from a comparison often implicitly made between debt contracts accrued by natural 
persons and those accrued by a sovereign state. We tend to think that individuals who enter a 
contract must fulfil their contractual obligations, except in very exceptional circumstances. 
There are both deontological and consequentialist reasons that support this intuition of the 
sanctity of contracts.6 We might think that it is integral to the autonomy and moral 
                                                 
6For a more elaborate account of these arguments, see Barry and Tomitova 2006; Reddy 2007. 
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personhood of individuals to take responsibility for their own actions, and that keeping one’s 
promises shows respect for other persons. Additionally, we might believe that failing to 
uphold our contractual obligations violates a duty of fair play. These deontological 
considerations seem to give a prima facie obligation to fulfil past promises. Consequentialist 
reasons further strengthen this prima facie obligation. Keeping one’s promises allows agents 
to enter mutually beneficial agreements and provides agents with incentives to make prudent 
decisions, since they know they will be held responsible for them. 7  
Many of these considerations thus rely on basic considerations of personal integrity. 
The purely deontological considerations, especially, seem to rely on the conception of a 
natural person who has an integral, temporally bounded existence. But the state is no such 
agent. The state is a moral and legal person in its own right, an incorporated group.8 An 
incorporated group does not merely act together, but has standing decision-making 
procedures by which it is able to grasp reasons and form and revise its intentions. It has the 
capacity to make intentional choices, the ability to grasp the obligations that apply to it, 
sufficient authority over its members to carry out its intentions, and it can—at least in 
principle—act voluntarily, without coercion by an outside force.9 Although the government—
a person or group of persons who rule and administer a political community—personifies the 
state, the state as a legal and moral person outlives particular governments.  
If one understands the state as a political association characterized by its durability, by 
its independence from a particular set of persons, and as a moral and legal person in its own 
right, the resistance of some to revoking the repayment norm becomes easy to understand. 
For challenging the repayment norm would threaten not only the practical viability of any 
                                                 




form of sovereign borrowing and lending, but the very existence of what we have come to 
understand states to be.  
The complex, collective agency of the state complicates the picture that the analogy to 
individual cases of debt acquisition paints. When stating that a state accrued debt, what we 
are actually saying is that finance ministers or other public officials within the executive 
branch of government decided either to knock on the door of private banks (private sovereign 
debt), governments (bilateral sovereign debt), or other multilateral institutions (public 
sovereign debt) or to sell bonds on private financial markets (again to either public or private 
creditors). It is in virtue of their role as legitimate public officials that the acts of these 
individuals become the state’s responsibility. Debts incurred by legitimate state officials are 
then treated as an obligation of the state.10 When, in turn, a new government comes to power, 
all the debts that were the obligations of the previous regime are treated as the new 
government’s obligations. Present and future citizens are then burdened with debt-servicing 
obligations.11 
The morally relevant disanalogy between individual debt contracts and sovereign debt 
contracts is that, in the former case, the same agent borrows and services the debt, whereas, in 
the latter, state officials at one point in time accrue debt that the citizenry—which is distinct 
from both state officials and the state—has to service at a later point.12 The question that 
                                                 
10This formulation assumes the ‘fictional conception of the state’, according to which the state is distinct 
from both the rulers and the ruled; Skinner 2009, p. 347. A representative of the state is a person who 
takes upon herself the artificial role of speaking or acting in the name of the state. 
11In this article, I bracket questions relating to intergenerational justice in debt repayment. For excellent 
discussions on this, see Gosseries 2007; Reddy 2007.  
12For a detailed discussion of this, see Wollner’s article in this issue.  
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springs from this disanalogy is thus: what normative link justifies burdening citizens with 
debt-servicing obligations for a debt they themselves did not accrue?13  
Before starting to answer this question in the next section, let me respond to a possible 
objection raised against formulating it in this way: that the question of legitimate debt-
servicing is only a subset of the more general question of legitimate taxation. Since one 
mechanism by which states pass on debt-servicing obligations to citizens is taxation, it can be 
argued that one should focus on the more general question instead; for taxing to repay 
sovereign debt is only a special application of the general principle of legitimate taxation. 
Conversely, if one still chooses to begin with the question of legitimate debt servicing, then 
whatever answer is given to this narrower question also needs to be plausible as an answer to 
the broader question of legitimate taxation. 
While I acknowledge that the state uses taxation to impose debt-servicing obligations 
on its citizens, I want to resist the conclusion that the question of legitimate debt servicing is 
simply a subset of the question of legitimate taxation. First, other ways of passing on debt 
servicing exist. A state ‘raises revenues to service its debt (at least in part) from taxes imposed 
                                                 
13Were one to adopt not the fictional conception of the state, but the ‘modern’ or ‘reductionist’ 
conception, the argument runs slightly differently. According to the modern conception, the state 
simply denotes ‘the individual person, or the body of individual persons, which bears the supreme 
powers in an independent political society’; Skinner 2009, p. 356. The representatives of the state simply 
are the state. According to this conception, individual and sovereign debt are thus analogous in that it 
is one and the same agent (the state) who accrues and services the debt. Note, however, that the same 
question arises. For even if the state is the primary bearer of the obligation to repay debt, the state can 
only service its debts by taxing its citizens. The question thus becomes: when can the state legitimately 
burden its citizenry with debt-servicing obligations via the collection of taxes? I am grateful to the 
editors of the Journal of Political Philosophy for pointing this out.  
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on citizens and other subjects taxable by the government’.14 Secondly, just because many 
domains exist in which normative questions arise that are ultimately connected to taxation—
questions relating to jus ad bellum or migration management, to name but a few—this does 
not make such questions merely subsets of the broader question of legitimate taxation. For 
particular characteristics of the different domains affect the answers given to the specific 
normative questions that spring therefrom.15 Nonetheless, as will become clear as I proceed, 
the answer I provide to the narrow question of legitimate debt servicing is similar to 
reasonable answers given to the question of legitimate taxation.16 Thus, whether one sees the 
question of debt servicing as connected to, yet independent from, the question of legitimate 
taxation or merely as a subset of it, one can still agree with the argument put forward here.  
 
II. THE USE OF DEBT IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
We saw how the complex, collective agency of the state questions the intuitive appeal the 
repayment norm has in cases in which the debtor is a natural person. In this section, I outline 
and defend one sufficient condition that justifies challenging the repayment norm. I argue 
that citizens cease to have debt-servicing obligations when the state uses its available budget 
                                                 
14Barry and Tomitova 2007, p. 52, my emphasis. This is acknowledged even by those who see the 
question of debt servicing as a sub-question of the one of legitimate taxation. ‘To be sure, states have 
other ways of raising revenue or lowering their debt burden, e.g., by selling off public assets or by 
inflating their currency’; (Wollner, 2017, p.9)ADDED, though this is the reference to the online 
publication. The article will only be published in this issue, but I don't know what the page number for 
that is going to be.  
15In Section III, I argue that one of the features of sovereign debt that makes the question of legitimate 
debt servicing specific is that high indebtedness of states may undermine their ability to act in the 
public interest. 
16See Wollner in this issue.  
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to systematically act in the particular interest of only a sub-group of its citizenry. To make this 
argument, I first introduce the odious-debt doctrine, since it succinctly formulates a sufficient 
condition to challenge the repayment norm. Then I propose and defend two distinct changes 
to the sufficient condition, as formulated by this odious-debt doctrine, and consider 
objections.  
The odious-debt doctrine offers a promising start to answer the question of when 
citizens can, and when they cannot, be legitimately burdened with servicing a debt accrued in 
their name. First developed after the Spanish‒American War of 1898, and later formalized by 
Alexander Sack in 1927, the classical legal doctrine of odious debt has proven hugely successful 
in challenging the repayment of debt accrued by autocratic regimes.17 The doctrine consists of 
two provisos, the first focusing on the nature of the regime that contracted the debt (the 
regular government proviso), and the second concentrating on the purpose and use given to 
the debt accrued (the public interest proviso). While disagreements prevail regarding the 
definitive interpretation of Sack’s classical doctrine, agreement exists regarding the normative 
relevance of the second proviso.18  
                                                 
17For an excellent analysis of how the enforcement of the repayment norm changed over time, see 
Lienau 2014. Lienau discusses how, before the Second World War, the repayment norm was challenged 
in a broad set of cases by debtors and creditors alike, but since then only in cases of regime change 
(from autocratic to democratic governments).  
18According to Sack, both provisos are sufficient conditions. That implies that ‘if a debt was in fact 
incurred to benefit the people, then it should not be considered odious even if it lacked popular 
consent’. In contrast, Gosseries (2007) shows that while the second proviso alone may be sufficient, the 
first proviso alone is not; it is the second proviso that does the normative heavy lifting. Despite this 
disagreement, scholars working with the odious-debt doctrine agree that, from a normative standpoint, 
the second proviso is the more significant one; Toussaint 2016. It is this second proviso that I focus on 
in the succeeding discussion.  
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According to the public interest proviso, debts ‘must have been contracted, and the 
money raised through it, used to care for the needs and in the interests of the State’.19 Thus, 
the answer that the second proviso of the odious-debt doctrine would provide to the question 
that concerns us here is the following. Whenever the state fails to contract the debt and use 
the money raised through it in the public interest, citizens cease to have debt-servicing 
obligations.  
So far, the doctrine’s second proviso has been interpreted as saying something about 
the scope of authority of the public officials accruing the debt. Iff the public official acted 
within the scope of her authority when accruing and spending the money, then the debt is 
legitimate and citizens have debt-servicing obligations.20 By contrast, if the public official 
exceeded the scope of her authority, the debt is odious and citizens cannot be legitimately 
burdened with debt-servicing obligations.  
 One of the strengths of this interpretation is that it remains fairly restrictive in its 
assessment of what constitutes odious debt, limiting the number of cases in which the 
repayment norm is challenged. This is important, since many proponents of the doctrine take 
its main strength to be that it can serve as a public standard; they want the doctrine to be 
immediately applicable, allowing us to discern in practice which debts ought to be repaid and 
which not. At the same time, this narrow interpretation of the doctrine comes at the price of 
excluding cases from normative challenge, where the enforcement of the repayment norm 
seems intuitively doubtful. Cases such as those triggering most debate in the latest sovereign 
debt crises in Europe, for instance, are excluded from scrutiny: cases in which the lower and 
middle classes bail out private creditors for their excesses in boom times, through austerity 
                                                 
19Sack, translated by Gosseries 2007, p. 101. 
20Dimitriu (2017) has defended this argument by extending the principles of agency law in the domestic 
arena to the international domain of sovereign lending.  
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measures in the debtor countries, and through international ‘solidarity packages’ from other 
countries.  
In what follows, I propose an alternative, broader interpretation of the second proviso 
than that focusing on the scope of the authority of public officials. The aim of this broader 
interpretation is to make sense of our intuition that there is something wrong with the way in 
which the most vulnerable groups in society have been burdened with debt-servicing 
obligations in cases such as the recent European crisis. While this makes the odious-debt 
doctrine less readily applicable, I think that much value resides in understanding why we hold 
the intuition that there is something wrong with holding citizens responsible for servicing 
debt that was not spent in their interest. Rather than providing a public standard that is 
readily applicable, I intend to give a principled answer to the question of when the repayment 
norm ought to be challenged, and when citizens can no longer be legitimately burdened with 
debt-servicing obligations.21 
                                                 
21This is not to say that the philosophical argument made here may not, in the end, inform a public 
standard. To do so, however, other relevant considerations will have to be evaluated first. One of the 
most crucial considerations (which I bracket by focusing exclusively on the debt-servicing obligations of 
the citizenry), for instance, is the question of the legitimate claims of creditors. Something that the 
odious-debt doctrine successfully captures is that it matters normatively whether creditors borrowed 
money in good or in bad faith. The argument runs as follows: to the extent that creditors did not know, 
and could not possibly have known about the illegitimate purposes to which a debt contract was put, 
lenders still plausibly hold a claim of restitution against the debtor state; Dimitriu 2017, p. 91. This is a 
reasonable argument to make, and I consider its implications in Section IV. Were I to have the ambition 
of turning the philosophical answer provided in this article into a public standard, however, I would 
have to address the question of how the legitimate claims of the creditors are to be weighed against the 
legitimate claims of the debtor in a much more extensive manner. I hope to provide a reasonable 
answer to this question in a future article.   
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 To begin offering this alternative, broader interpretation of the second proviso, let us 
briefly examine why states accrue debt. When the ‘public interest’ is invoked in the context of 
the acquisition and investment of sovereign debt, examples such as the waging of a just war or 
the building of dams come to mind. The state can be said to accrue and use debt in the public 
interest when it invests the attained resources in common goods. But how representative, 
really, are prototypical examples such as the building of a dam or the fighting of a just war? 
What do states accrue debt for? 
 Debt can be accrued to meet whatever expenses the government has. Most commonly, 
it is accrued with the aims of repaying old debt, covering a deficit, stimulating the economy, 
or developing new sectors.22 In principle, states could also use other fiscal or monetary policy 
levers to pursue any of these goals. In terms of fiscal policy, they could increase their revenue 
by increasing taxes, or they could lower their expenditure (via adjustment and austerity 
policies). In terms of monetary policy, they can (via the central bank, whose real and formal 
independence varies across countries) make use of the printing press to stimulate the 
economy or pay their deficit, or lower interest rates (thereby giving agents incentives to 
spend, rather than save, and stimulating the economy via private credit).  
Using each of these levers carries a certain cost for different groups of the population, 
however. We can think about domestic groups along two axes: classes or sectors. Whereas 
sectors demarcate particular branches of a national economy (telecommunications, banking, 
industry, agriculture, and so on), classes are social divisions based on social and/or economic 
status.23 Now, who is affected by tax rises, for instance, depends on the concrete tax reforms 
                                                 
22Bucheit et al. 2013. 
23I intentionally adopt a non-technical definition of class that resembles its common usage. For an 
excellent discussion of different ways of understanding class, see Wright 2015. Wright establishes a 
typology of three different forms of understanding class: namely, one which defines class in terms of 
individual attributes and definitions (the stratification approach); a second which thinks about class in 
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made, by how progressive or regressive the tax system is in relation to class, or whether 
particular sectors are taxed more than others. Adjustment will largely affect the lower and 
middle classes, those who rely on the public services offered by the state.24 In terms of 
monetary policy, a devaluation of the currency might strengthen the export sector, although a 
very unstable exchange rate is harmful for all sectors across the board. Devaluation also harms 
those sectors relying on imports, as they become more expensive. Finally, lower interest rates 
can help stimulate the economy, replacing public spending with private credit, but also risks 
damaging consequences, as with the effects of all the easy money flowing into the housing 
market in the world’s capitals today.  
We gain two main insights from looking at the actual reasons governments have to 
accrue debt, which translate into two central modifications I propose to make to the public 
interest proviso. First, we learn that it would be both difficult and misleading to separate the 
discussion of the use given to sovereign debt from a broader discussion of the use of the state’s 
budget. Money is fungible, and the debt accrued by the state is only a portion of the budget 
that the state has at its disposal (fiscal and monetary policy levers generating the rest). The 
fungibility of money makes it extremely cumbersome (and maybe even practically impossible) 
to trace the use given to the money raised with each individual debt contract. More 
importantly, from a normative standpoint, the source of the money seems irrelevant. What is 
normatively relevant is not with what purpose each (individual) debt contract is accrued and 
ultimately invested, but whether the state promotes the public interest.  
Taking the fungibility of money seriously thus requires reformulating the public 
interest proviso in the following manner. If the state, with all its available budget, strives to 
serve the public interest, then the citizenry has debt-servicing obligations, regardless of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
terms of a variety of opportunity hoarding (the Weberian approach); and a third which defines class in 
terms of mechanism of domination and exploitation (the Marxist approach). 
24For an excellent account of the classist character of adjustment policies, see Blyth 2015. 
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use to which the (individual) debt contracts has been put to use. Conversely, if a state is 
sufficiently unjust, its citizens are not obliged to repay debts, regardless of the use made of the 
borrowed money.  
A second insight we gain from looking at the actual reasons governments have to 
accrue debt is that invoking a general notion of the ‘public interest’ is more complicated than 
idealized examples, such as the waging of a just war or the building of dams, would initially 
suggest. Most decisions made by the state (over and above decisions such as the enforcement 
of the law) are not equally in the interest of all citizens. Behind the ‘hidden abode’ of a very 
vague and generic invocation of the ‘public interest’, we actually have three sorts of cases. At 
one end of the spectrum, we have cases such as the dam example, in which the government 
accrues and uses the debt for things that are truly in the public interest, where public interest 
is understood as the ‘general interest’ that stands above the particular interests of different 
sectors and classes. At the other end of the spectrum are those cases in which the government 
accrues and uses the debt for particular interests. Sitting in the middle are those cases in 
which the government accrues and uses the debt for things that are in the interest of all on 
some (minimal) level, but track the interests of some more than others, creating clear winners 
and losers.25 
It is my contention that most of the things that the state does fall into this third 
category. Nearly everything that the state does, its actions and its omissions, inevitably creates 
                                                 
25Critics who are particularly sceptical of the existence of truly general interest may think that even 
idealized examples of common goods are actually cases that track the interests of some more than 
others. It can be argued, for instance, that even in the dam case there are clear winners, namely those 
sectors of society that are more dependent on water and electricity. My overall argument should still be 
convincing for those who reject the existence of a general interest as such. For I argue that states must 
act in the interest of different sectors and classes in a minimally just way. 
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winners and losers.26 Beyond a very minimal provision of a general interest (in public safety, 
for instance), the state always positions itself to promote the particular interests of different 
sectors and classes.27 This is true for decisions made regarding debt, and it is equally true for 
decisions concerning the other policy levers. The stabilization of the currency is a good 
example of this. On the face of it, a stable exchange rate is something that all sectors benefit 
from across the board. But if one looks behind this thin façade, there are clear winners and 
losers. If the currency is kept at a competitive rate, say, this will benefit the export sector, 
while harming those industries heavily relying on imports. Thus, keeping the currency 
competitive may benefit most, but some more than others, while also creating clear losers.  
The suggestion that most of what the government does (when accruing debt as well as 
when using any of the other policy levers) leads to the creation of relative winners and losers 
is not a particularly contentious claim. So far, however, this basic insight has not been 
accounted for when specifying the second proviso. Recall that, according to the narrow 
interpretation of the second proviso of the odious-debt doctrine, citizens cease to have debt-
servicing obligations if the money accrued by the debt was not used in the public interest. 
                                                 
26For a mathematical defence of the argument that sovereign debt will inevitably benefit some citizens 
more than others, see Reddy 2007. Reddy shows how the extent to which each individual citizen 
benefits from the resources gained by accruing the debt, as well as the extent to which they will have to 
carry the costs of debt repayment, differs depending on the timing of individual lives and variation in 
the extent to which individual persons experience increased advantage as a result of the resources 
gained through the acquisition of debt. 
27Let me clarify how I use the different understandings of ‘interests’. I use ‘particular interests’ for the 
interests of different groups of the citizenry, such as different classes or sectors. I use the term ‘general 
interest’ for those that stand above the particular interests of different sectors and classes and are truly 
shared by all groups of the citizenry. Finally, as will become clearer as I proceed, the notion of public 
interest I adopt is not to be conflated with general interest, but is a minimally, relationally just balance 
between the particular interests of different groups of the citizenry. 
 14 
What I suggest by opening the black box of ‘public interest’ is that it is not enough to 
implicitly rely on a notion of public-interest-as-general interest—a public interest that stands 
above the particular interests of different classes and sectors of society. Instead, to determine 
whether citizens can be legitimately burdened with debt-servicing obligations, one also needs 
to look at the extent to which the state serves the particular interests of different sectors and 
classes.  
Recognizing that it is a simplification to assume that the state can always act in the 
public-interest-as-general-interest leads me to propose the following standard to question the 
repayment norm. If the state systematically acts according to the interests of only a fraction of 
its citizenry, unless this class is those who are disadvantaged in society, the repayment norm 
can be challenged and citizens cease to have debt-servicing obligations in virtue of their 
membership in the state.  
The addition ‘unless this class is those who are disadvantaged in society’ is important 
here. Without this clarification, following the logic of the revised proviso would force us to 
conclude that states that meet some more demanding standard of social justice—like the 
difference principle—actually fail to meet the standard of the proviso and are thus unable to 
legitimately burden their citizenry with debt-servicing obligations. Adding this caveat avoids 
us having to reach that implausible conclusion. 
It also emphasizes the importance of keeping separate that which is required to meet 
the minimal standards of the proviso, and meeting more demanding social justice principles. 
Keeping these two standards separate is crucial for adopting a very demanding standard of 
social justice (such as ‘everybody winning equally with every state action’) and making debt 
repayment dependent on that would disregard the insight just won. It would simply be 
impossible to meet, since (nearly) all cases of state action or omission create winners and 
losers. Of course, this is not to say that it is undesirable for the state to meet more demanding 
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principles of social justice. But the obligation to service debts should not be dependent on the 
state meeting these more demanding principles. 28 
In sum, I therefore propose to revise the narrow public interest proviso of the odious-
debt doctrine in the following way:  
The narrow public interest proviso I revise: citizens cease to have debt-
servicing obligations whenever the state fails to contract the debt and use 
the money in the public interest.  
The broad public interest proviso I defend: citizens cease to have debt-
servicing obligations when the state uses its available budget to 
systematically act in the particular interest of only a sub-group of its 
citizenry, unless this sub-group is those who are most disadvantaged in 
society.  
 
Normatively trained scholars may rightly argue that more needs to be said to establish 
where exactly the boundary lies between cases where the promotion of particular interests is 
                                                 
28Those who maintain that the question of debt servicing is only a subset of the question of legitimate 
taxation would have reason to agree with this conclusion. They would accept that whatever standard 
one adopts for the narrower question of debt servicing also needs to be adopted as a standard for the 
broader question of legitimate taxation. Adopting a very demanding social justice standard for 
legitimate debt servicing would thus force us to conclude that a state can only tax if it meets a very 
demanding standard of social justice. To avoid this implausible conclusion, those who see the question 
of debt servicing as a subset of the question of legitimate taxation adopt a minimal standard to 
determine debt-servicing obligations, in line with what is argued here. In defence of his own theory of 
‘legitimate taxation’, Wollner argues that the state only has a right to tax its citizens to repay debt if ‘it 
effectively delivers at least minimal standards of social justice’; Wollner forthcoming.  
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sufficiently balanced to ground debt-servicing obligations and those where it is so unequal as 
to make debt non-binding. I think that this is a difficult but valuable exercise, and that there 
are potentially two (compatible) routes to do so. First, one could specify where the boundary 
lies by introducing a substantive standard. Using Walzer’s distinction between monopoly and 
dominance could be one strategy. It could be argued, for instance, that the actual pattern of 
relative wins and losses of the different policies adopted by the state need to vary over time in 
such a manner that there are no dominant classes or sectors. A dominant class or sector would 
be one which can command control not only within one sphere of distribution (monopoly), 
but across different spheres (dominance).29 What this substantive standard rightly emphasizes 
is that what is at stake here is not that the state meets some sufficientarian standard of 
distributive justice, but that it considers the particular interests of all classes and sectors of 
society. Secondly, one could specify where the boundary lies by introducing a procedural 
standard. According to such a procedural standard, a state could legitimately tax its citizens to 
service debt to the extent that the different classes and sectors have a fair opportunity to 
contest the use to which resources are put.30 
What these two potential routes suggest is that the philosophical debate regarding 
how to distinguish cases where the state is sufficiently receptive to the interests of different 
sectors and classes of society to legitimately burden its citizens with debt-servicing obligations 
from those in which it cannot legitimately do so is far from settled. This does not, however, 
deprive us of the ability to recognize cases in the real world where the reformulated second 
proviso is being violated. There will be convergence of different standards in at least some 
                                                 
29Walzer 1983, p. 10.  
30This could be modelled in line with Michelman’s (1967) proposal; I am grateful to Steven Winter for 
this suggestion. A limitation of the procedural standard comes from the restricted ability of the lower 
and lower middle classes to actually impose their view, even when they are the majority. For a version 
of this argument, see Shapiro 2002; I thank this journal’s anonymous referees for pointing this out.  
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negative sense. Enough empirical evidence exists to suspect that any plausible standard—
whether substantive or procedural—would converge on ruling out the same set of (empirically 
significant) cases. 
In recent years, political economists have gathered disheartening evidence that 
suggests several states are directly implicated in advancing the interests of a financial elite 
over those of the more vulnerable sectors and classes of society. According to Hacker and 
Pierson, the rising share of income for the wealthiest is explained by an ‘organized combat’ 
fought by the wealthiest. 31 Their main thesis is that there is a feedback loop in which the 
super-rich can use their capital to buy themselves political influence, which in turn generates 
further top income gains for them. Much of this ‘organized combat’ takes place outside the 
public gaze, where paid lobbyists use the money of the wealthiest to influence political 
decision making. Since backroom deals rather than elections secure policy agendas, voting 
today is devoid of meaning and becomes an ‘electoral spectacle’ at best.32 
                                                 
31Hacker and Pierson 2010. 
32For Piketty, inequality is not the result of organized combat, but the mechanical result of forces for 
divergence inherent to capitalism, which can be expressed by a series of ‘fundamental laws’ (most 
famously, r>g) that lead the share of capital to tend to rise, all else equal. This structural explanation is 
often combined with a more ideational explanation, where a particular set of ideas is set to drive the 
creation and instantiation of a particular set of structures, which benefits some more than others. 
Political ideas are deployed that favour unfettered markets. Over time, these ideas produce self-
perpetuating structural advantages for the richest and these advantages are then justified by invoking 
the very same ideas that helped bring them about. The financialization of the British economy is 
explained in this manner; see Hopkin and Lynch 2016. Despite differences in their explanatory theories, 
contemporary political economists agree in their interpretation of the descriptive evidence that the 
wealthiest one percent is increasing its share of income at the expense of the rest and of the implication 
of the state therein.  
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  The ‘Winner Takes All’ political landscape suggests that, in the radically unequal 
world in which we live today, there are cases in which the profile of state expenditures is such 
that it systematically tracks the interests of a particular class—the financial elite—failing to 
consider the interests of different sectors and classes of society. Proving this in concrete cases 
requires a level of empirical detail that would hijack the discussion that concerns us here.33 
The crucial takeaway point is that, whenever this can be proven empirically, there is a 
normatively important reason to question the state’s ability to legitimately pass on debt-
servicing obligations to the citizenry via the collection of taxes.  
The two key claims defended in this section are thus the following. First, due to the 
fungibility of money, the relevant question to determine the citizens’ obligation to service 
debt is not how the money raised via a concrete debt contract was used, but about the use of 
the state budget overall. Secondly, since the citizenry is composed of different sectors and 
classes with distinct particular interests, to determine the citizenry’s debt-servicing obligation 
one needs to pay attention to the question of whose particular interest the state acted in. 
Taking these claims into account results in the following reformulation of the second proviso. 
Citizens cease to have debt-servicing obligations if the state budget as a whole, regardless of 
its source, is systematically used in the particular interests of any sub-group of the citizenry 
who are not the worst off. 
 
III. HIGH SOVEREIGN INDEBTEDNESS AS A THREAT TO THE STATE’S ABILITY TO ACT 
IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
Having argued for the broadening of the odious-debt doctrine’s second proviso in line with 
the two modifications defended above, I now argue that an extra normative reason exists that 
justifies questioning the state’s ability to legitimately burden its citizenry with debt-servicing 
                                                 
33For a discussion of the variations in how the Winner Takes All logic applies empirically to different 
advanced economies, see Matthijs 2016.  
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obligations. My starting point is the insight that high sovereign indebtedness may inhibit the 
state’s ability to act in the public interest. Against this backdrop, I argue that, whenever the 
acquisition of further debt threatens the state’s very ability to act in the public interest, this is 
a ground to question the citizens’ obligation to service that debt.34 Whereas the revised 
proviso defended in the preceding section focuses on the actual use the state makes of the 
state budget, the sufficient condition defended here draws attention to the state’s very ability 
to act in the public interest.  
 Over the course of the postwar period, the state in advanced economies had 
assumed the responsibility for providing direction to the economy and for managing the social 
consequences of growth.35 But as growth slumped and unemployment grew, fulfilling these 
obligations became ever more challenging and the state was threatened by the eruption of a 
‘triple crisis’.36 First, a social crisis loomed large on the horizon, as distributional conflicts 
heightened over a pie that was no longer expanding at the same pace. Secondly, the state 
faced a fiscal crisis, as the state’s tax revenues ceased to be sufficient to cover its expenditures. 
Thirdly, a legitimation crisis became ever more likely, as the state feared having to adopt 
politically costly austerity measures to bring expenditures in line with its revenues.37  
                                                 
34The normatively interesting case is the one where state A at T1 is able to act in the public interest but, 
due to the acquisition of further debt, becomes unable to do so at T2. The case where state B is initially 
unable at time T1 to act in the public interest due to over-indebtedness is less interesting, since it is no 
other than state A at T2. It follows that if citizens of state A at T2 do not have debt-servicing 
obligations, the same applies for state B at T1.  
35For an analysis of this argument for the US, see Krippner 2011. For a defence of this argument for 
Western Europe, see Streeck 2013.  
36Krippner 2011. 
37While for Marxist scholars the legitimation crisis exposed the real nature of the state as a servant to 
the interests of the capitalist class—a capitalist state that had to shield its role in supporting capitalist 
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 Turning to finance offered a temporary way out of this triple crisis for advanced 
economies after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods agreement in August 1971. Wanting 
neither to put a more progressive tax system in place, nor to lower expenditure, the state saw 
the adoption of policies that allowed both the state and consumers to borrow on private 
financial markets as an attractive solution.38 The choice to turn to finance to avoid the triple 
crisis, instead of increasing taxes for higher-income brackets, can already be interpreted as a 
political positioning in defence of the interests of the financial elite. Once the financial elites 
started extending credit to their own, and to other people’s, governments, the grip they had 
on states’ policy agendas was reinforced, for they attained a new form of claim on states; one 
based on commercial contractual agreements. 
The turn to finance thus comes hand-in-hand with the rise of what Streeck calls a 
‘second constituency’ of the modern state. This second constituency is the untaxed financial 
elite that became the state’s creditors.39 As a second constituency, the financial elite attains 
contractual claims that the debtor state must consider, and whose interests may stand in 
                                                                                                                                                       
accumulation by engaging in various forms of social spending (Habermas 1973; Offe 1974)—non-Marxist 
scholars held that the origins of the legitimation crisis lay in the democratic polity; Bell 1976. 
38Interestingly, the turn to finance and the move away from a ‘tax’ to a ‘debt’ state was a choice made 
across partisan divisions and by political leaders across the political spectrum. Hopkin and Lynch (2016) 
show, for instance, how financialization in Britain was not only the outcome of policies adopted under 
the Thatcher government, but continued under New Labour. For an analysis of the variation in the 
extent and manner in which advanced economies turned to finance, see Matthijs 2016; Solt 2016Sorry, 
this was my mistake. I checked again and they ask to cite it as "2016"I have also changed the reference  
below.  . For an account explaining the distribution of income and political influence in Europe from a 
traditional ‘varieties of capitalism’ perspective, see Hall and Soskice 2001. For different accounts 
explaining the variation within Europe in today’s Winner-Takes-All political scenario, see the special 
issue of Politics and Society (2016) entitled ‘The New Politics of Inequality in Europe’.  
39Streeck 2013. 
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conflict with the state’s citizenry, whose claims on public policy are predicated, not on a 
commercial contract, but on their membership of the state as a political community. The 
dilemma that the debtor state may face, then, is trying to satisfy these two different 
constituencies at the same time, both of which operate on the basis of incompatible logics.  
What the most recent crises in advanced economies revealed is that, in moments in which 
the state is no longer able to satisfy both constituencies, it chooses to prioritize the interest of 
the financial elite, as the state’s domestic and international creditors, over that of its 
citizenry.40 This prioritization is manifested in policy, through the implementation of austerity 
measures in the debtor state, the full repayment of creditors, and the acquisition of further 
debts to pay off old, maturing loans and bonds.  
One important insight that this analysis reveals, then, is that in order to defend the 
repayment norm—in order to insist, that is, that sovereign debts must always be serviced by 
the citizenry of the debtor state—it is not enough to simply point to the sanctity of contracts. 
Rather, the contractual claim that the creditors hold must be seen in relation to, and weighted 
against, the claim that citizens have, in virtue of being part of the state as a political 
community. The conflict of interests between the first and the second constituency of the 
state highlights the importance of not seeing the contractual claim of creditors in a vacuum, 
but of considering the weight of such claims in today’s real political landscape, one in which 
the interests of the citizenry may be opposed to those of an international financial elite.  
The concern that heavy indebtedness by a sovereign state may be inimical to the state’s 
responsiveness to the interests of its citizenry is not a distinctly contemporary contention. 
Several Enlightenment thinkers voiced these concerns very explicitly. Hume famously stated 
that ‘either the nation must destroy public credit, or public credit will destroy the 
                                                 
40Streeck refers to this prioritization of the second over the first constituency as the transition from the 
‘debt state’ to the ‘consolidation state’, the main objective of the consolidation state being to reassure 
creditors that they will be repaid; ibid., p. 154. 
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nation’.41Sieyès was hostile to the entire idea of sovereign debt and favoured a stronger system 
of taxation to finance public expenditure.42 He considered the rejection of public credit 
fundamental to a truly responsive constitutional government. The concern that Hume and 
Sieyès shared was that sovereign debt ‘could make government officials over-attentive to the 
needs and desires of creditors … This dependence would render the state less responsive to 
true public need and neglectful of the greater national interest’.43 
 The arguments of such diverse scholars as Hume, Sieyès, and Streeck highlight that 
there are no coincidental reasons why highly indebted states may be unable to act with the 
interest of the first constituency at heart, for the acquisition of sovereign debt may 
progressively undermine their ability to do so. This is partly a matter of distribution. It 
concerns the question of how much of the state’s budget is devoted to honouring contractual 
obligations to its creditors, and how much is devoted to meeting the legitimate claims of its 
citizenry. The more indebted the state is, the larger will be the portion of the budget that will 
have to be devoted to repaying its creditors, and the more difficult it may become for the state 
to meet the legitimate claims of its citizenry. The central worry is not a distributive one, 
however, but speaks to the state’s responsiveness to the interests of its citizenry. The main 
concern seems to be that the highly indebted state will lose its ability to act in the name of the 
citizenry it allegedly represents; the dependence on its ‘second constituency’ thus threatening 
the state’s very raison d'être.  
The insight that high sovereign indebtedness may inhibit the state’s ability to act in the 
public interest points to an additional normative reason which justifies challenging the 
legitimacy of the state to pass on debt-servicing obligations to its citizenry. The idea is that 
                                                 
41Hume,1752, in Hont 2005, p. 325.  
42Sieyès 2003. ORIGINAL PUBLICATION DATE IS JANUARY 1789, but I have read and worked with the 
cited version  
43Lienau 2014, p. 47. 
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whenever the acquisition of further debt threatens the state’s ability to act in the public 
interest—as understood here—this is a ground to question the citizens’ obligation to service 
that debt.44 While the revised proviso of the odious-debt doctrine thus focuses on the actual 
use the state makes of its budget, the sufficient condition defended here draws attention to 
the state’s very ability to act in the public interest.  
Let me make three additional clarifications to avoid possible objections. First, arguing that 
the acquisition of sovereign debt may progressively undermine the ability of the state to act in 
the interest of its citizenry does not entail that the acquisition of sovereign debt is problematic 
as such. This is where my argument comes apart from that of Hume and Sieyès. From a 
normative perspective, borrowing might be justified in terms of distributive justice, the same 
way discounting is—if the future will be richer than the present, debt is a way of transferring 
money from the rich to the poor. From an economic perspective, debt contracts can be 
justified, since they mobilize credit. In contrast to equity contracts, in which the returns of the 
investor depend on the success of the enterprise being invested in, debt contracts promise a 
fixed return. Without this promise, not enough capital would be available.45 It is difficult, for 
instance, to imagine the development of the British railway system, as well as the industrial 
development that was fuelled by it, without debt contracts.46 Similarly, developing states can 
be said to accrue debt today, to make the large investments needed to change the structure of 
their economy, climb up the value chain of production and service provision, and generate 
greater economic growth. The problem, then, is not one with debt and credit per se, for debt 
                                                 
44To be clear, this is not a question of debt sustainability—of how much debt a state can accrue before it 
will be unable to service it—but a question of how much debt the state can accrue without losing its 
ability to act in the public interest of its citizenry.  
45Turner 2016, p .6.  
46Ibid., p. 35. 
 24 
may be economically productive and normatively defensible. The problem, instead, seems to 
be with the quantity and the allocation of debt.   
Secondly, one important aspect of Streeck’s account that needs to be emphasized is the 
class-specific nature of his analysis. Although Streeck talks about ‘constituencies’, it would be 
an oversimplification to think about the first constituency as a homogenous citizenry. If the 
discussion surrounding ‘public interest’ revealed anything at all, it is that it is misleading to 
assume that a robust general interest of the state’s ‘first constituency’ exists that can be 
sacrificed in the name of the state’s ‘second constituency’. What we witness in the cases that 
Streeck describes is a prioritization of the interests of that portion of the financial elite that 
became the creditors of that particular state over the interests of that portion of the state’s 
citizenry that is most reliant on public services.47 
Thirdly, the alleged opposition between the particular interests of the financial elite qua 
creditors and the middle- and lower-income classes of the debtor state needs to be qualified. 
In the same way as I did not intend to suggest that there is no such thing as a general interest, 
but simply argued that, in most cases, whatever the state does creates relative winners and 
losers, it would be an oversimplification to maintain that the interests of the financial elite 
and the debtor state’s middle- and lower-income classes are always opposed to one another in 
                                                 
47For an excellent account of how and why adjustment policies are class-specific policies, see Blyth 2015. 
The policy of cutting inflation, for instance, is best thought of as a class-specific tax, since it targets the 
interest of creditors over that of debtors. ‘When “too much money” chases “too few goods”—an 
inflation—it benefits debtors over creditors since the greater the inflation, the less real income is 
needed to pay back the debt accrued … The politics of cutting inflation therefore take of the form of 
restoring the “real” value of money by pushing the inflation rate down through “independent” (from the 
rest of us) central banks. YOU WERE RIGHT ABOUT EVERYTHING EXCEPT THE "TAKE OF", WHICH 
FOR WHATEVER REASON SEEMS TO EB WRONG IN THE BOOK… Creditors win, debtors lose. One 
can argue about the balance of benefits, but it’s still a class-specific tax’; Blyth 2015, p. 19.  
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a zero-sum logic. Austerity policies, for instance, are not only adopted to meet the conditions 
of the multilateral creditors, but also because of the belief that reducing the deficit via cutting 
expenses is necessary to boost growth in the long term. Similarly, the prioritization of creditor 
repayment in moments of crisis could be interpreted as an attempt to maintain 
creditworthiness and ensure future access to credit, something which may well be in the 
interest of the citizenry more generally.  
What I am suggesting, then, is not that no policies exist that can serve the general interest, 
but that this in itself may not be enough to justify burdening citizens with debt-servicing 
obligations. What is needed, additionally, is for the state to consider the relative impact its 
policies can have on its citizenry. If the state acts in a way that systematically benefits the 
financial elite, relatively speaking, then arguing that certain policies are in the general interest 
of the citizenry as a whole may not be enough to ground the citizenry’s debt-servicing 
obligations.  
 
IV. EX ANTE VERSUS EX POST INTERPRETATIONS 
In short, in this and in the preceding section, I proposed and defended two sufficient 
conditions that allow us to challenge the repayment norm, one which relates to the use made 
of the state budget, the second to the state’s ability to act in its citizenry’s interest. In 
principle, both of these conditions can be interpreted from an ex ante and an ex post 
perspective. Adopting the ex ante perspective, one asks whether a debt contract would be 
binding for the state’s citizenry, were the sovereign to accrue debt at that point in time. It is 
an ex ante perspective, because the question of the bindingness of debt is asked before the 
debt is actually accrued. In contrast, the ex post perspective asks the question of debt 
bindingness after the debt was accrued.   
 The great advantage of adopting an ex ante perspective when interpreting these two 
sufficient conditions is that the legitimate claims of repayment of creditors are also 
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considered. The relevant questions here would be whether, at the time of forming the debt 
contract, it was clear or should have been clear to the creditor, first, that the debtor state does 
not act in the public interest and, secondly, that fulfilling that debt contract would undermine 
the state’s ability to act in its citizenry’s name. If the answers to these questions are negative, 
creditors have a legitimate claim to repayment and citizens have debt-servicing obligations. If 
the answer to either is affirmative, creditors do not have legitimate claims to repayment and 
citizens do not have debt-servicing obligations. Adopting an ex ante perspective to interpret 
these two sufficient conditions to challenge the repayment norm makes it easier to translate 
the purely philosophical answer provided so far to a public standard.   
 There are cases, moreover, in which creditors will undoubtedly be able to establish this 
in an ex ante manner. Especially after having revised the first sufficient condition in a way that 
makes the use of the state budget and not of the money raised via the acquisition of a 
particular debt contract the relevant question to ask, answering it becomes easier from an ex 
ante perspective. In addition, as we saw in the preceding section, there are cases in which the 
empirical evidence is robust enough to be able to know in an ex ante manner that the state’s 
ability to act in the interest of its citizenry is being undermined by the acquisition of further 
debt. Whenever the empirical evidence suffices to establish that creditors knew or should 
have known that the two sufficient conditions for the legitimate extension of debt were not 
met, then these two conditions can be interpreted in an ex ante perspective.   
 One way in which these two philosophical conditions could be turned into a public 
standard from an ex ante perspective is via the formulation of rules for lenders. Indexes would 
have to be found that serve as a good proxy for the two sufficient conditions. The rules for 
lenders would then entail that they can only expect to be repaid if they lend to states with a 
score lower/higher than X in index Y. If they choose to lend to a sovereign state with an index 
score lower/higher than that under which citizens have debt-servicing obligations, creditors 
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cannot legitimately expect to be repaid. Naturally, this would discourage creditors from 
extending credit to states that do not meet the two sufficient conditions. 
Although developing and defending the precise indexes serving as proxies for both 
sufficient conditions goes way beyond the scope of this article, let me make two tentative 
suggestions to illustrate the type of indexes I have in mind. For the first sufficient condition, a 
composite index could be developed that combines in a standardized way the GINI index with 
the democracy index.48 A creditor lending to a country that exhibits a score Y in the composite 
GINI‒democracy index should not expect to be reimbursed. For the second sufficient 
condition, another composite index would have to be developed based on the debt to GDP 
ratio and the country risk.49  
Developing such indexes to turn the sufficient conditions into rules for lenders is a 
highly ambitious enterprise. Specifying when the point has been reached where the 
acquisition of another debt contract results in the state’s inability to pursue the public interest 
in an ex ante manner is extremely challenging. Just how difficult it can be to identify where 
this threshold lies is illustrated by the analogous debate surrounding debt sustainability. 
                                                 
48A composite index combines in a standardized way different indexes of factors to provide a useful 
statistical measure of an overall performance over time. The GINI index is a statistical measure of 
distribution most commonly used to measure income or wealth distribution among a population. It is 
the most common coefficient used to measure inequality. The democracy index is a figure developed by 
the Economist Intelligence Unit based on given categories, namely electoral process and pluralism, civil 
liberties, the functioning of government, political participation, and political culture. 
49Country risk is an index that captures the risks associated with investing in a foreign country, 
including political risks, exchange rate risks, sovereign risks, and transfer risks. Combining the debt-to-
GDP ratio with the country risk is important to capture the fact that a debt level that is sustainable for a 
state with a low country risk is not sustainable for a state with a higher country risk. This is important, 
since the state’s ability to act in the interest of the citizenry is undermined when the debt threatens to 
become unsustainable or is sustainable only at a very high price for the state’s citizenry.  
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Establishing the point at which the acquisition of further debt will make the sovereign unable 
to service its maturing contracts continues to be a topic of heated discussion among 
economists.50 If it is difficult to find a sustainability threshold for this fairly technical question, 
it will prove even more difficult to find an analogous threshold to establish ex ante when the 
state will be so indebted as to become unable to satisfy its citizenry’s interests. Moreover, 
many sources of uncertainty remain, and contingent factors that one may not have been able 
to reasonably predict from an ex ante perspective may impact the state’s ability to act in the 
public interest.51  
In the light of these difficulties, the ex ante approach needs to be complemented with 
an ex post perspective. From an ex post perspective, all we need to know in order to be able to 
challenge the debt-servicing obligations of the citizenry is that the state does not act 
according to the public interest as understood here, and/or that it does not have the ability to 
do so, due to its high indebtedness. Adopting this ex post perspective does not track the 
claims of creditors in the same way that the ex ante perspective does, since it may be due to 
contingent factors that the state does not meet these sufficient conditions. In the light of this, 
it is unsurprising that scholars with the ambition of defending a public standard that is readily 
applicable have resisted a broader interpretation of the odious-debt doctrine’s second proviso 
and have failed to consider the second sufficient condition I propose here. For it would prove 
difficult to formalize these conditions into a doctrine that seeks to serve as a public standard.  
That it cannot be formalized into a legal doctrine does not entail, however, that it is 
normatively insignificant. Recall that the ambition of this article is to answer the philosophical 
question of when the repayment norm ought to be challenged from the perspective of the 
                                                 
50For an excellent overview of the persistent difficulties in assessing debt-sustainability levels, see 
Buchheit et al. 2013.  
51Some such contingent and difficult-to-predict factors may be the economic policy of other countries 
or extreme market developments. 
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citizenry’s obligations. Given this limited aim, the failure to find definitive answers to 
questions such as the threshold question does not dilute the force of the argument made that 
the undermining of the state’s ability to act in the citizenry’s interest is a relevant normative 
consideration. Whenever it can be established in an ex post manner, first, that the state does 
not use its budget to serve the public interest and, secondly, that its high indebtedness erodes 
its ability to act in the public interest, these two are sufficient normative reasons to challenge 
the repayment norm and citizens’ obligation to service debt accrued in their name.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
One background rule governs the practice of sovereign borrowing and lending: that ‘sovereign 
borrowers must repay regardless of the circumstances of the initial debt contract, the actual 
use of the loan proceeds, or the exigencies of any potential default’.52 It is so entrenched in the 
sovereign debt and credit regime that any reduction in the claims of creditors is described in 
terms of ‘relief’, ‘assistance’, and ‘forgiveness’.53   
In this article, I have defended two sufficient conditions that justify challenging this 
repayment norm. Taking the second proviso of the odious-debt doctrine as my starting point, 
I argued, first, that whenever the state uses its available budget (regardless of its source) to 
systematically act in the interests of any sub-group who are not the worst off, the state can no 
longer legitimately pass on debt-servicing obligations to its citizenry. Secondly, I argued that 
whenever the acquisition of further debt threatens the state’s ability to act in the public 
interest, this is a ground on which to question the citizens’ obligation to service that debt. 
 
  
                                                 
52Lienau 2014, p. 1. 
53Barry and Tomitova 2006, p. 53. 
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